Nebraska Law Review
Volume 74 | Issue 2

Article 5

1995

The FTC's Reliance on Extrinsic Evidence in Cases
of Deceptive Advertising: A Proposal for
Interpretive Rulemaking. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d
311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993)
Dennis P. Stolle
University of Nebraska College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
Recommended Citation
Dennis P. Stolle, The FTC's Reliance on Extrinsic Evidence in Cases of Deceptive Advertising: A Proposal for Interpretive Rulemaking. Kraft,
Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993), 74 Neb. L. Rev. (1995)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol74/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Note*

The FTC's Reliance on Extrinsic
Evidence in Cases of Deceptive
Advertising: A Proposal for
Interpretive Rulemaking. Kraft,
Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ...........................................
II. Background ............................................
A. Federal Trade Commission Advertising Authority...
B. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC ..................................
III. Analysis ...............................................
A. The Standard for Deception ........................
B. Reliance on Extrinsic Evidence .....................
1. Objective Standard .............................
2. Constitutionally Protected Commercial Speech...
3. Agency Discretion ...............................
C. Restraining Agency Discretion ......................
1. Precedent .......................................
2. The 1994 Enforcement Policy Statement on Food
Advertising .....................................
3. Theoretical Proposal for an Interpretive Rule ....
a. Fairness .....................................
b. Substance ...................................
c. Efficiency ....................................
IV. Conclusion .............................................

353
354
354
357
359
359
362
362
366
367
368
368
369
370
371
372
372
373

Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REvIEw.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and guidance of Professor Mark
Fondacaro, University of Nebraska Center on Children, Families and the Law,
and the editorial assistance of Jennifer Robbennolt.

1995]

DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
I. INTRODUCTION

The Federal Trade Commission's ("Commission) decision in In re
Kraft, Inc., shocked many members of the legal community.2 The
decision reasserted the Commission's long dormant authority to disregard relevant extrinsic evidence and rely solely on its own reasoned
analysis in determining whether an advertisement implicitly conveys
deceptive claims. 3 Viewed by many as an example of the Commission
flexing its regulatory muscle,4 the decision was reminiscent of the expansive discretion asserted during the Commission's pre-Reagan era.5
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reluctantly upheld the Commission's
decision, solidifying the Commission's broad discretion to determine
when commercial speech is deceptive 6 and thereby exclude such
speech from full constitutional protection.7 This Note analyzes the dilemma the Seventh Circuit faced in Kraft, Inc. v. FTC as it heard arguments that were compelling as a matter of policy, but weak as a
matter of law, and suggests that the Commission should clearly define
the parameters of its reliance on extrinsic evidence through administrative rulemaking.
Part II begins by describing the basis of the Commission's authority to regulate advertising and how that authority is implemented,
and then provides the factual background and procedural history of
Kraft. Part III first provides an analysis of the standard for deception
implemented by the Commission in advertising cases. Next, it provides an analysis of Kraft's principle arguments regarding extrinsic
evidence and why those arguments succeed as a matter of policy but
fail as a matter of law. Finally, it suggests that both the development
of precedent and the issuance of policy statements have failed to ade1. 114 F.T.C. 40 (1991).
2. Felix H. Kent, The 'Krafe Case: Symbol ofFTC Activity, 205 N.Y. L.J., June 21,
1991, col. 1 (discussing the controversy within the legal and advertising community resulting from the Commission's decision).
3. In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40 (1991).
4. Kent, supra note 2 (stating that Kraft should be taken as a message to advertis-

ers that "the cop is back on the beat").
5. Id. See also Ross D. Petty, FTC Advertising Regulation: Survivor or Casualtyof
the Reagan Revolution?, 30 Ams. Bus. L.J. 1 (1992)(comparing Commission activities prior to the Reagan administration to Commission activities during and immediately following the Reagan administration).
6. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
7. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982)(stating that commercial speech
that is determined to be "[fMalse, deceptive, or misleading" is "subject to restraint"); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1979)("When dealing with...
commercial speech we... 'allow[ ] modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.'" (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 & n.24 (1976)("Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.").
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quately restrain the Commission's discretion in the area of extrinsic
evidence, and that administrative rulemaking would provide a more
efficient and effective means of restraining the Commission's discretion. Part IV concludes the note with a suggestion that the Commission initiate a rulemaking proceeding to clarify the area of reliance on
extrinsic evidence.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Federal Trade Commission Advertising Authority

The Federal Trade Commission Act ("Act") prohibits the dissemination of false advertisements likely to induce the purchase of food
products.8 The Act defines the dissemination of such advertisements
as an "unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce," 9
and empowers the Commission to regulate trade for the purpose of
preventing such deceptive acts or practices.1O The Commission is authorized to enforce the Act against individual companies on a case by
case basisl or against entire industries through the establishment of
industry-wide standards.12
The Commission may opt' 3 to proceed by prosecuting an individual
company when the Commission has reason to believe that company is
engaging in a deceptive practice and that regulation of that practice
would be in the public interest.' 4 In such cases, the Commission
serves the company with a complaint and notice of a hearing5 to be
held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ").16 In advertising
cases, the AUJ will determine whether the advertisement in question
7
is false within the meaning of the Act and issue an initial decision.'
Before an initial decision will be considered a final action subject to
judicial review,' 8 it must be appealed to the Commission,19 where it
will be reviewed de novo. 20 Following the Commission's issuance of a
final order, respondents may seek review in the United States Courts
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

15 U.S.C. § 52 (1988).
Id.
Id. § 45.
Id. § 45(b).
Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B).
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)(stating that "the choice
between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's
discretion").
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1988).
Id.; 16 C.F.R. § 4.4(a) (1995).
16 C.F.R. § 3.42(a) (1995).
Id. § 3.51(a).
Id. § 3.51(b).
Appeals to the Commission are made pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 3.52 (1995).
16 C.F.R. 3.54(a) (1995).
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of Appeal. 2 1 In reviewing the Commission's findings, courts apply the
highly deferential substantial evidence test.2 2 Furthermore, courts
have traditionally recognized the Commission's expertise in assessing
whether particular acts or practices are deceptive. 2 3 In light of this
expertise, and in accordance with the prescribed standard of review,
courts give great deference to the Commission's determinations of
deception. 2 4

21. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1988).
22. Courts are compelled by statute to apply the substantial evidence test. See id.
("The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall
be conclusive."). See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
(1986)("our review is governed by 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)"); Hospital Corp. of Am. v.
FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1384 (7th Cir. 1986)(stating that "the standard of judicial
review of the Federal Trade Commission's findings of fact... is the familiar substantial-evidence standard"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987); Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. FTC, 741 F.2d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 1984)("In reviewing the Commission's
liability determinations, we apply the standard of review set out in 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(c)"); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1329 (7th Cir.
1981)(stating that "the Commission's findings ... are to be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence"); Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir.
1979)("we may not substitute our inferences for those drawn by the Commission
simply because we might have evaluated the facts differently as an original matter"). The test has been judicially defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
23. See, e.g., Thompson Medical Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(stating that "[t]he FTC has substantial expertise in... assessing whether advertisements are.., deceptive"); American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 686
(3d Cir. 1982)(stating that "[tihe Commission's familiarity with the expectations
and beliefs of the public, acquired by long experience, is especially crucial"); Litton Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 1982)(stating that
"[d]etermining whether an advertisement is deceptive draws upon the FTC's familiarity with the public's expectations"); Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579
F.2d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 1978)(stating that "the Commission has accumulated
extensive experience and is... in a better position than the courts to determine
when a practice is deceptive"); Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398, 1403 (2d
Cir.)(stating that "the Commission's greatest expertise [is] what constitutes deception in advertising"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); Resort Car Rental System, Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1975)(stating that the Commission
"has the expertise to determine whether advertisements have the capacity to
deceive").
24. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965)(stating that
"[tihis Court has frequently stated that the Commission's judgment is to be given
great weight by reviewing courts"); FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 48
(1965)(stating that "it is not for courts to say whether this violates the Act. The
Commission is often in a better position than are courts to determine when a
practice is deceptive'" (quoting Colgate-Polmolive, 380 U.S. 374, 380 (1965)));
Thompson Medical Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(stating that
"the Commission's conclusion that acts or practices are likely to deceive is due
special deference"); American Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 968 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)("we must perform our ...judicial function... while... according due
deference to the Commission's judgment"); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 738 F.2d
554, 562 (2d Cir. 1984)(holding that the Commission's findings must be given

356

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:352

Alternately, the Commission may proceed by establishing industry-wide standards with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 2 5 Such standards may take several forms, including
enforcement policy statements, 2 6 industry guides,27 and trade regulation rules.28 Enforcement policy statements are typically published in

the Federal Register and provide information regarding future enforcement strategies and objectives. 29 Enforcement policy statements
do not carry the force of law, but do provide guidance to how the substantive law will be interpreted and applied.30 Industry guides are
interpretive rules that set forth particular types of acts or practices
which the Commission would likely find deceptive.S1 Like enforcement policy statements, industry guides do not carry the force of law,
but provide useful guidance to the law.3 2 Trade regulation rules are

substantive "rules which define with specificity acts or practices which
are unfair or deceptive... [and] may include requirements prescribed
for the purpose of preventing such acts or practices."33 Trade regulation rules do carry the full force of law.34

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.
34.

"great weight"); Litton Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 1982)(stating that "[clourts give great weight to the FTC's legal conclusions in deceptive
advertising cases"); Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th
Cir. 1979)(stating that "[tihe Commission has the discretion to interpret the
meanings of various communications"); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481
F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir.)(stating that "the Commission's judgment is to be given
great weight"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.
v. FTC, 352 F.2d 415, 417 (6th Cir. 1965)(stating that "it was within the discretion of the Commission to interpret and determine the meaning of the
commercials").
15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1) (1988).
Id. § 57a(a)(1)(A).
Id.; 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (1995).
15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B) (1988); 16 C.F.R. § 1.7 (1995).
STEPHANm W. KAzwrr, FEDERAL TRADE ColVUssioN § 25.04 (1993)(citing FTC
Operating Manual ch 8.5.5).
Id.
16 C.F.R. §§ 1.5, 1.7 (1995).
Id. See also FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 48 (1965)(describing
guides as "not fixed rules as such, and ... designed to inform businessmen of the
factors which would guide Commission decision[s]"); Helbros Watch Co. v. FTC,
310 F.2d 868, 869 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1962)(stating that "[guides] serve to inform the
public and the bar of the interpretation which the commission, unaided by further consumer testimony or other evidence, will place upon advertisements using
the words and phrases therein set out"), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963); In re
Gimbel Bros., Inc., 61 F.T.C. 1051, 1073 (1962)(stating that "[i]nsofar as the
Guides Against Deceptive Pricing are concerned... they do not constitute law").
15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (1988); 16 C.F.R. § 1.8 (1995).
16 C.F.R. § 1.8 (1995)("A violation of a rule shall constitute an unfair or deceptive
act or practice in violation of section 5(a)(1) of that [Federal Trade Commission]
Act, unless the Commission otherwise expressly provides in its rule.").
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B. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC
Kraft manufactures and markets Kraft Singles process cheese food
slices. In the 1980s, the increasing presence of less expensive imitation slices 35 caused Kraft to lose some of its market share. In respouse, Kraft developed its multimillion dollar "Five Ounces of Milk"
advertising campaign. 3 6 The campaign was an attempt to inform consumers that Kraft singles are nutritionally superior to imitation slices
because they contain milk and other dairy products whereas imitation
slices consist primarily of water, vegetable oil, and flavoring.37 Two of
the ad sets in KrafWs campaign are referred to as the "Skimp" ads and
the "Class Picture" ads. The Skimp ads emphasized the calcium content of Kraft Singles. Although there were several variations on the
Skimp ads, all of the variations contained statements similar to the
following: "Imitation slices use hardly any milk. But Kraft has five
ounces per slice. Five ounces. So her little bones get calcium they
need to grow."38 The Class Picture ads emphasized the calcium content of Kraft Singles without any express comparisons to imitation
slices.39 Most of the variations on the Class Picture ads contained
statements similar to the following: "KRAFT Singles are important.
KRAFT is made from five ounces of milk per slice. So they're concentrated with calcium. Calcium the government recommends for strong
bones and healthy teeth."40
Consistent with Kraf's express statements, Kraft Singles are in
fact made from five ounces of milk.4l However, during processing, approximately 30% of the milk's original calcium content is lost.42 This
leaves one slice of Kraft Singles with about 15% of the U.S. recommended daily allowance of calcium per ounce, approximately the same
amount as the majority of imitation slices.4 3 In 1987, the Commission
filed a complaint against Kraft alleging that the 'Five Ounces of Milk'
advertising campaign materially misrepresented the calcium content
35. Imitation slices need not conform to the nutritional requirements of pasteurized
process cheese food, 21 C.F.R. § 133.173 (1995), and are required to carry the

label "imitation." 21 C.F.R. § 101.3(e) (1995).
36. In 1985 and 1986, Kraft spent over $30 million on the 'Five Ounces of Milk' advertising campaign. In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 52 (1991).
37. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993). Pasteurized process cheese food is required by federal regulation to contain at least 51% cheese ingredients after pasteurization and at least one additional dairy ingredient. 21 C.F.R. § 133.173(a) (1995).
38. In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 52 (1991).
39. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
40. In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 127 (1991).
41. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
42. In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 119 (1991).
43. Id. at 120.
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of Kraft Singles by implying that one slice of Kraft Singles has a calcium content equivalent to five ounces of milk and that one slice of
Kraft Singles contains more calcium than most imitation slices. 44
In a hearing before an ALJ, the complaint counsel argued that both
misrepresentations were apparent on the face of Krafl's advertisements. 4 5 After voluminous extrinsic evidence was introduced at the
hearing,46 the ALJ decided that such evidence was unnecessary,
agreeing with the complaint counsel that both misrepresentations
were facially apparent. 4 7 Consequently, the ALJ required Kraft to
48
cease and desist from its multimillion dollar ad campaign.
Kraft appealed the initial decision to the Commission, arguing that
the ALJ should have relied on the available extrinsic evidence in determining whether a deceptive claim was implicitly conveyed. 49 The
Commission affirmed the AL's decision that both the Skimp and the
Class Picture ads could be interpreted on their faces as conveying the
milk equivalency claim without resort to extrinsic evidence.50 The
Commission further held that the Skimp ads could be determined on
their faces to convey the imitation superiority claim5l but the Class
Picture ads could not,52 nor was there sufficient extrinsic evidence to
support a finding that the Class Picture ads conveyed the superiority
claim.53
Kraft appealed the Commission's decision to the Seventh Circuit,
arguing that the Commission should be required as a matter of law to
rely on extrinsic evidence to determine whether an implicit deceptive
claim is conveyed.5 4 After reviewing the findings of the Commission

44. Id. at 47.
45. Id. at 55.
46. The extrinsic evidence included copy tests, materiality surveys, and bioavailability research. Many of the surveys were conducted by experts in the advertising field and by leading consumer survey organizations. Additionally, numerous
experts testified regarding their interpretations of the copy tests as well as their
interpretation of the ads themselves. Id. at 67.
47. Id. at 126-28. Although the AIJ did not rely on the extrinsic evidence, he stated
that the evidence was consistent with his analysis. Id.
48. Id. at 114-15.
49. Id. at 119.
50. Id. at 125, 128.
51. Id. at 129.
52. Id. at 130.
53. Id. at 131.
54. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 318 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).

1995]

DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING

test,5 5 the Seventh
under the highly deferential substantial evidence
6
decision.5
Circuit affirmed the Commission's
III. ANALYSIS
A.

The Standard for Deception

"The Commission will [currently] find an act or practice to be deceptive if there is a representation, omission, or practice, that misleads the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer's detriment."57 This standard represents a departure from
earlier analyses under which an act or practice would be determined
deceptive "if it has a tendency or capacity to mislead a substantial
number of consumers in a material way."58 The adoption of the reasonable consumer standard symbolizes the trend toward increased objectivity begun by the Commissioners appointed under the Reagan
administration. 59
Application of the current deception standard in advertising cases
involves a three part analysis beginning with a determination of what
claims an advertisement makes.60 An advertisement will be deemed
to convey a particular claim if reasonable consumers would interpret
the advertisement to convey that claim. 61 In making this determina-

tion, the Commission will often distinguish between express and im55. Kraft argued that the Commission's findings should be reviewed de nova because
Krafts First Amendment rights were at issue. However, the court found Krafts
argument unconvincing and refused to review the Commission's findings under a
standard other than the traditional substantial evidence test. Id. at 316-17.
56. Id. at 321.
57. FTC's Policy Statement on Deception sent to Chairmen of Senate Commerce, Science and TransportationCommittee and House Energy and Commerce Committee, 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 689, 694 (Oct. 14, 1983)[hereinafter
Statement on Deception]. The phrase "in a material way" is often substituted for
the phrase "to the consumer's detriment" appearing at the end of the current
standard. Either phrase is acceptable because according to the Statement on Deception, "injury and materiality are different names for the same concept." Id. at
694.
58. Deception Policy Statement Prepared by Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk
and Transmittedon Feb. 29 to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 46
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 372, 379 (Feb. 29, 1984)[hereinafter Bailey
and PertschukStatement].
59. The reasonable consumer standard of deception became binding when it was applied inln re Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984). For a discussion of
the increased restraint exhibited by the Commission beginning in the Reagan
administration, see Petty, supra note 5.
60. Statement on Deception, supra note 57, at 689-90.
61. In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 788 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987); In re Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103
F.T.C. 110, 164-66 (1984). See also Statement on Deception, supra note 57, at 690
(distinguishing the approaches to express and implied claims).
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plied claims,62 both of which may be found likely to mislead. 6 3 An
express claim involves a direct representation, 6 4 whereas an implied
claim involves indirect representations created through context and
may vary along a continuum from claims that are clearly deceptive to
6
claims that are barely deceptive. 5
The second step of the Commission's analysis is to determine
whether claims are misleading from the perspective of the reasonable
consumer. 6 6 An advertisement is deceptive if any reasonable interpretation of that advertisement is misleading, even though other reasonable interpretations are possible.67 Whether an interpretation is
reasonable will be determined from the perspective of a member of the
group at which the advertisement was targeted.68
The final step of the Commission's analysis is to determine
whether a false or misleading claim is material. 69 Any misrepresentation that is likely to affect consumers' decisions regarding a commercial transaction is material. 7 0 Express claims are presumed to be
material, 7 1 as are intentional implied claims. 72 Furthermore, claims
that involve health or safety are presumed material whether the claim
3
is express or implied, intentional or unintentional.7
62. In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 788 (1984)("the Commission has
traditionally distinguished between express and implied claims"), aff'd, 791 F.2d
189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987). See also Statement on
Deception, supra note 57, at 690 (distinguishing the approaches to express and
implied claims).
63. See, e.g., In re Removatron Intl Corp., 111 F.T.C. 206, 292-95 (1988), aff'd, 884
F.2d 1489 (1st Cir. 1989).
64. In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 788 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).
65. Id. at 789 ("They range from . . . language that literally says one thing but
strongly suggests another to language which relatively few consumers would interpret as making a particular representation.").
66. Statement on Deception, supra note 57, at 689-90.
67. See In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 511 (1980)(stating that "[ilt
is
hornbook law that where an advertisement is subject to two or more possible
interpretations, an advertiser will be liable for the truth of each possible meaning"), aff'd, 676 F.2d 385, (9th Cir. 1982); In re National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 185 (1976)("where an advertisement conveys more than one
meaning, one of which is false, the advertiser is liable for the misleading variation"), enforced in part by, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Statement on
Deception, supra note 57, at 691 ("when a seller's representation conveys more
than one meaning... the seller is liable for the misleading interpretation").
68. Statement on Deception, supra note 57, at 691.
69. Id. at 693.
70. Id. Furthermore, the affected decision need not be the decision to purchase a
product and may be merely a decision of "how to act" under certain circumstances. Id. at 693 n.45 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 538(2)).
71. Id. at 694.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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In cases like Kraft, involving allegations of implied deceptive
claims, the most critical and perhaps the most controversial step in
the Commission's tri-partite analysis is the initial determination of
what claims are conveyed. The Commission will first attempt to determine what claims are made by examining the net impression created by the advertisement. 74 If, through such an examination, the
Commission is unable to determine that an alleged implied claim is
made, then the Commission may rely on extrinsic evidence75 such as
consumer surveys, expert testimony, copy tests, and marketing research. 76 Consequently, companies will often amass large amounts of
expensive extrinsic evidence in an attempt to convince the Commission that no deceptive claims are implicitly conveyed. Such evidence
is usually admissible; 77 however, whether the Commission will rely on
the evidence is largely a matter of agency discretion.78 It was upon
the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the scope of this discretion that
74. In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 790 (1984).
75. Id. at 789.
If our initial review of evidence from the advertisement itself does not
allow us to conclude with confidence that it is reasonable to read an advertisement as containing a particular implied message, we will not find
the ad to make the implied claim unless extrinsic evidence allows us to
conclude that such a reading of the ad is reasonable.
Id. See also In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 319 (1983)(stating that
"[tihere also may be instances where claims cannot be inferred from a facial examination of the advertisements and resort to extrinsic evidence is necessary"),
aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); In re The
Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C. 639, 728 (1981)("In many cases, the Commission has refused to accept particular interpretations ... because the advertisements themselves did not imply them and no extrinsic evidence had been offered to prove
their apprehension by... consumers."); In re Leonard F. Porter, Inc., 88 F.T.C.
546, 625-26 (1976)(stating that "[wihile it is certainly within the authority and
expertise of the Commission to make.., a determination [of implied deception],
the judgment... cannot... be made without resort to record evidence respecting
the assumptions, attitudes, and behavior of consumers").
76. Statement on Deception, supra note 57, at 690 n.8.
77. 16 C.F.R. 3.43(b) (1995).
78. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(stating that
the Commission's decision was apparently "reached independent[ly] of the supplemental evidence"); Carter Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir.
1963)("[The Commission may draw its own inferences from the advertisement
and need not depend on testimony or exhibits (aside from the advertisements
themselves) introduced into the record."); Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d
337, 342 (7th Cir. 1960)("We think the Commission could find and conclude, from
an inspection of the advertisements alone, that they had a tendency to
[deceive]."), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883 (1960); Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d
29, 31 (7th Cir. 1944)"The Commission had a right to look at the advertisements
in question,... and then decide for itself whether the practices engaged in by the
petitioner were unfair or deceptive .... ); In re The Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C. 639, 728
(1981)C"[Tlhe Commission has sufficient expertise to determine an advertisement's meanings-express and implied-without necessarily resorting to evidence of consumer perceptions.").
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Kraft's multimillion dollar 'Five Ounces of Milk' advertising campaign
rested.
B.

Reliance on Extrinsic Evidence

On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Kraft's primary argument was
that the Commission erred as a matter of law in failing to rely on extrinsic evidence in determining that the ads contained implied deceptive claims.79 Kraft argued that without consideration of extrinsic
evidence the Commission could have "no objective basis" for a determination that the ads conveyed implicit deceptive claims.80 Kraft further argued that a cease and desist order based on the Commission's
purely subjective determination of implied deception thwarts constitutionally protected non-deceptive commercial speech.S1
1.

Objective Standard

Kraft argued that, in all cases of allegedly implied claims, the Commission should be required to base determinations of deception on extrinsic evidence rather than its own reasoned analysis.8 2 Kraft
contended that consumer perceptions are influenced by so many external variables that the Commission could not possibly predict what implied messages are conveyed without relying on extrinsic evidence.8 3
This claim is supported by a wealth of academic commentary, 8 4 and
79. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 318 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Commentators have noted the complexity of determining the messages conveyed
by advertisements. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, InterpretingDeceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 657, 672-74, 717 (1985)(discussing empirical evidence tending to show the complexity of determining what inferences consumers draw from
advertisements); Shari Seidman Diamond, Using Psychology to Control Law:
From Deceptive Advertising to CriminalSentencing, 13 LAw & Hums. BEHAv.239,
241 (1989)("[T]he legal test of deceptive advertising is fundamentally a behavioral test-a psychological test of perception."); Richard W. Pollay, Deceptive Advertisingand Consumer Behavior: A Case for Legislative and JudicialReform, 17
U. KAN. L. REV. 625, 629-31 (1969)(discussing empirical evidence that consumers
interpret advertisements as a function of multiple complex factors). Commentators have also noted the inability of the Commission to deal effectively with this
complexity. See, e.g., Paul H. LaRue, FTC Expertise: A Legend Examined, 16
ANTrrRusT BuL. 1, 28 (1971)(stating that "[tihe invalidity of the presumption of
FTC expertise should be sufficient in itself to end judicial reliance upon it"); Ira
M. Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and FalseAdvertising, 64 COLUM.
L. REv. 439, 470 (1964)("[al review of the cases demonstrates that generally the
Commission will find that an advertisement promises what the Commission itself
believes it promises"); Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protectionand
the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 661, 678 (1977)("[T]here is no
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was recognized by the court as having "some force as a matter of
8
policy." 5

Kraft further argued that support for such a standard is found in
an examination of the analogous context of false advertising claims
brought under the Lanham Act.86 Kraft contended that because extrinsic evidence is generally required to establish an implied claim
under the Lanham Act,87 extrinsic evidence should also be required to
establish the nearly identical claim under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Seventh Circuit recognized that had Kraft been brought
by a competitor under the Lanham Act, extrinsic evidence probably
would have been required.SS However, the court reasoned that such a
standard is unnecessary in cases brought under the Federal Trade
Commission Act because the Commission holds the expertise necessary to make such decisions without the aid of extrinsic evidence. 8 9
Yet, in the next breath, the court admitted that "proof of the FTC's
inexpertise abounds,"90 making Kraft's arguments compelling as a
matter of policy. 9 1
Although Kraft presented strong policy arguments for an objective
standard,92 the arguments ran contrary to a large body of precedent.93

85.
86.
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

reason to believe that commissioners of the FTC have unusual capacity or experience in coping with questions of meaning."); Richard A. Posner, The Federal
Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. Rv. 47, 86 (1969)(suggesting that expertise
may be lacking because many commissioners do not serve full terms and staff
turnover is high); Ivan L. Preston, The FederalTrade Commission'sIdentification
of Implications as ConstitutingDeceptive Advertising, 57 U. CN. L. RFv. 1243,
1268 (1989)("to operate without extrinsic evidence ... is to subject oneself to
arbitrary conclusions"); Suzanne Bonamici, Comment, The Use and Reliabilityof
Survey Evidence in Deceptive Advertising Cases, 62 OF. L. REV. 561, 572
(1983)(Deference to the FTC's presumed expertise ... is frequently and intensely
criticized.").
Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 319 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
Id. at 319. The Lanham Act provides that any person engaging in deceptive advertising "shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such" advertising. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
See, e.g., Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381, 386 (2d Cir.
1986)("[Wlhen the claim is that a literally true statement has a tendency to mislead, confuse or deceive, evidence must be introduced to show what the person to
whom the advertisement was addressed found to be the message."); Tambrands,
Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 673 F. Supp. 1190, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)("I do not
find plaintiff's claim to be facially false. And since defendants offered no evidence
that consumers were deceived or confused by this claim in plaintiff's advertising,
defendants have failed to carry their burden with respect to this claim.").
Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 319 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
Id.
Id. See also supra note 84.
Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 319 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
Id.
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Thus, the Seventh Circuit was faced with the dilemma of choosing between good policy on the one hand and well supported law on the
other. Compelled by the long line of cases refusing to impose upon the
Commission a requirement of reliance on extrinsic evidence, 94 the
court ultimately rejected Krafts arguments for an objective standard.95 The seminal case in this line of precedent is Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission.9 6
In Zenith, the Commission alleged that Zenith Radio Corporation
had misrepresented, through advertisements boasting of its radios' capacity to receive foreign broadcasts, the number of tubes its radios
contained by referring to certain tuning devices and other electronic
devices as tubes. 9 7 The Commission further alleged that, as a consequence of this misrepresentation, Zenith had implicitly represented
that the large number of tubes contained in its radios increased the
ability of the radios to receive radio broadcasts when, in fact, some of
those devices referred to as tubes were not actually tubes and did not
affect radio reception. 98
The Commission found Zenith's actions to be in violation of the Act
and entered a cease and desist order. 99 Zenith appealed the Commission's decision to the Seventh Circuit. The sole issue before the Seventh Circuit was "whether there [was] substantial evidence to support
the order."10 0 In upholding the Commission's order, the court stated
that "It]he Commission was not required to sample public opinion to
determine what the petitioner was representing.... The Commission
had a right to look at the advertisements.

.

., consider the relevant

evidence..., and then decide for itself whether the practices engaged
in by the petitioner were unfair or deceptive .... ."11
Further support for the Commission's discretion to "decide for itself,"102 independent of extrinsic evidence, whether an advertisement
93. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965); American
Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687-88 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1982); Resort Car
Rental System, Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor.
MacKenzie v. United States, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381
F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967); Carter Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th
Cir. 1963); Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962); E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 741 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957); Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29,
31 (7th Cir. 1944).
94. See cases cited supra note 93.
95. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 319 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
96. 143 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1944).
97. Id. at 31.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 30.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 31.
102. Id.
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is implicitly deceptive was provided by the Supreme Court in Federal
Trade Commission v. Colgate-PalmoliveCo.l03 In Colgate-Palmolive,
the Commission filed a complaint against Colgate-Palmolive Co.
charging that their Rapid Shave ad set was deceptive.' 0 4 The ad set
consisted of three television commercials, each of which claimed that
Rapid Shave shaving cream could soften the toughness of sandpaper. 0 5 The commercials presented what appeared to be a piece of
sandpaper being covered with Rapid Shave and the tough surface then
immediately being shaved clean. Rapid Shave was in fact capable of
softening sandpaper after a substantial soaking; however, to facilitate
the filming of the commercial, Colgate-Palmolive used a plexiglass
mock-up with the appearance of sandpaper rather than using actual
sandpaper.' 0 6
The Commission determined that the advertisements conveyed
three representations: "(1) that sandpaper could be shaved by Rapid
Shave; (2) that an experiment had been conducted which verified this
claim; and (3) that the viewer was seeing this experiment for himself."1o7 The Commission argued that the third claim was clearly not
true and, therefore, the advertisement was deceptive within the
meaning of the Act.108 Colgate-Palmolive Co. contended that the record was inadequate to sustain the Commissions's finding.109 However, the Court held that the record was adequate and that the
Commission was not required to "conduct a survey of the viewing public before it could determine that the commercials had a tendency to
mislead."11o
There must, of course, be substantial evidence to support Commission conclusions. However, the decisions in Zenith and ColgatePalmolive teach us that substantial evidence, even in cases of implied
claims, may consist of the advertisement itself. Thus, these early cases
have been cited consistently throughout the years as providing the
Commission with a license to disregard all types of extrinsic evidence
introduced at a hearing and find implicit deception based solely upon
its own subjective analysis."' However, both Zenith and Colgate103. 380 U.S. 374 (1965).

104. Id. at 376.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 376.
107. Id. at 386.

108. Id.
109. Id. at 391.

110. Id. at 391-92. The

language "tendency to mislead" was used prior to adoption of
the reasonable consumer standard. Bailey and Pertschuk Statement, supra note
58, at 379. However, the language is taken to hold nearly the same meaning as
the reasonable consumer standard.
111. See, e.g., American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687 & n.10 (3d Cir.
1982)("[T]he Commission need not buttress its findings that an advertisement
has the inherent capacity to deceive with evidence of actual deception." (citing

366
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Palmolive were decided prior to the Supreme Court's extension of first
amendment protections to commercial speech,112 leaving the door
open for Kraft to challenge the Commission's decision on constitutional grounds.
2. ConstitutionallyProtected Commercial Speech
Kraft argued that the Commission's "current subjective approach
chills some truthful commercial speech."11 In the course of developing major ad campaigns, companies will often make large expenditures for marketing tests to ensure that the ads do not convey any
deceptive claims. This is precisely what Kraft did. However, under
the current standard, if such testing shows conclusively that the ads
do not convey any deceptive claims, such results are no guarantee that
the ads are permissible. No matter how sophisticated the testing process, the Commission has the discretion to discount the scientific evidence and, based on its own opinion, determine that the ad is
deceptive on its face.114 Kraft argued that the uncertainty produced
by such a standard will lead companies to avoid making non-deceptive
constitutionally protected claims for fear that the Commission may arbitrarily decide that the claim is deceptive.115
Again, Kraft's arguments were compelling as a matter of policy,

even persuading the court to suggest that "reliance on extrinsic evidence should be the rule rather than the exception."116 However, like

the objective standard argument, Kraft's commercial speech argument
was fatally flawed as a matter of law. The court rejected Kraft's first
amendment argument, relying primarily upon the Supreme Courts
decision in Zauderer v. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel.117
In Zauderer, an Ohio attorney ran a set of two newspaper ads for
legal services.1 1 8 The Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio filed a complaint against Zauderer charging that one of
Zauderer's ads was deceptive in that they implicitly conveyed the
claim that a client whose case is unsuccessful would not be liable for

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965))); Simeon Management Corp.
v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 n.11 (9th Cir. 1978)(citing FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965)); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th
Cir. 1953)(quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29, 31 (1944)), rev'd in
part, 348 U.S. 940 (1955). See also cases cited supra note 78.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 320 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
See cases cited supra note 93.
Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 320 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
Id. at 321.
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
Id. at 629-30.
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costs.119 Before the Supreme Court, Zauderer challenged the State's
sanction on First Amendment commercial speech grounds.l 2 0 In upholding the decision against Zauderer, the Court, quoting ColgatePalmolive, stated that "[wihen the possibility of deception is as selfevident as it is in this case, we need not require the State to 'conduct a
survey of the.., public before it [may] determine that the ad had a
tendency to mislead.' "121
The Seventh Circuit determined that the ads Kraft disseminated
included a possibility of deception as self-evident as in the ad in
Zauderer.122 The courts reasoning was based upon the similarities
between the ad in Zauderer and those disseminated by Kraft. Specifically, the court noted that in both cases "an omitted piece of information.., led to potential consumer deception, and in both cases the ads
were literally true, yet impliedly misleading."123 The court further
bolstered its holding by relying on previous cases that found commercial speech to be "less susceptible to the chilling effect of regulation
than other" forms of speech.12 4
3. Agency Discretion
Krafts arguments for a standard requiring the Commission to rely
on extrinsic evidence in all cases of implied claims are, in effect, arguments for a restriction of agency discretion. Although the Seventh
Circuit felt compelled by precedent to uphold the scope of discretion
asserted by the Commission in the Kraft litigation, the court was
clearly uncomfortable with the potential ramifications of its approval
of such broad agency discretion. In an attempt to temper the effect of
its holding, the court emphasized its recognition of the validity of
Kraft's arguments as a matter of policy 1 2 5 and even went so far as to
take the opportunity to give the Commission a piece of advice, stating
that "the Commission would be well-advised to adopt a consistent position on consumer survey methodology... so that any uncertainty is

reduced to an absolute

minimum."126

Judge Manion, in his concurring opinion, emphasized his discomfort with a standard that grants the Commission discretion to "avoid
extrinsic evidence by simply concluding that a deceptive, implied
119. Id. at 633. The complaint also alleged that Zauderer's ads had violated several
provisions of the Ohio DisciplinaryRules.
120. Id. at 636.
121. Id. at 652-53.
122. Krai, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 321 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
123. Id.

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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claim is facially apparent."127 Manion noted that such a standard
renders companies unable to predict which advertisements may be
deemed deceptive and thereby poses a serious threat to constitutionally protected consumer speech.128 However, Manion agreed that the
court's decision was compelled by precedent.' 2 9 Manion reiterated
that it would be in the Commission's best interest to heed the advice of
the court and restrain its discretion by "develop[ing] a consumer survey methodology that advertisers can use to ascertain whether their
ads contain implied, deceptive messages."130

C. Restraining Agency Discretion
1.

Precedent

Controlling agency discretion is a critical issue throughout administrative law.1' Agency discretion can be checked and controlled in
several ways, including the requirement that administrative agencies
establish a system of precedent and explain departures from precedent.' 3 2 The requirement of adherence to precedent works to ensure
and predictable, thereby rethat agency decisions are reasoned
33
straining the agency's discretion.1
However, in the case of the Commission's reliance on extrinsic evidence, precedent has been insufficient to provide any true restraint on
discretion. Rather, the precedent has served as a justification for expansive agency discretion,134 and leaves companies with little guiId. at 327 (Manion, J., concurring).
Id. at 327-28 (Manion, J., concurring).
Id. at 328 (Manion, J., concurring).
Id. (Manion, J., concurring).
See KENNETH CuLp DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADmNmSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.5 (3d ed. 1994).
132. See, e.g., Atchison T&SFR Co. v. Witchita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808
(1973)(stating that "departure from prior norms... must be clearly set forth so
that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency's action."); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414,416 (D.C. Cir. 1977)("This court emphatically
requires that administrative agencies adhere to their own precedents or explain
any deviations from them."); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v.
NLRB, 547 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1078 (1976); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(stating that when
an agency "swerves from prior precedents without discussion it may cross the line
from the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute"). See also DAVIs & PIERCE, supra
note 131, at 206 ("The dominant law clearly is that an agency must either follow
its own precedents or explain why it departs from them.").
133. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(stating that reasoned decision making, which includes stating clear reasons for varying from precedent, "furthers the broad public interest of enabling the public to
repose confidence in the process as well as the judgments of its decision-makers."). See also DAvis & PIERCE, supranote 131, § 11.5 (discussing various mechanisms for controlling agency discretion).
134. See cases cited supra note 78.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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dance as to when the Commission will rely on extrinsic evidence.
Judge Manion urged the Commission to remedy the situation itself by
creating a standard that would provide companies with ample guidance on the issue of extrinsic evidence.135 One way that administrative agencies can provide such guidance when their system of
precedent either fails or develops too slowly is through the issuance of
policy enforcement statements.
2. The 1994 Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising
From time to time, the Commission will issue enforcement policy
statements
in the area of deceptive advertising.-36 In 1994, the Commission issued
its Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertis13 7
ing.
The statement was intended to clarify the Commission's
enforcement policy regarding nutrient content and health claims in
food advertising in light of the passage of the Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act of 1990 and the Food and Drug Administration's 1993
promulgation of implementing regulations.138
In describing the legal framework for Commission action, the Enforcement Statement reiterated its policy that the Commission may
rely on its own expertise in finding an advertisement deceptive, and
need not rely on extrinsic evidence.' 3 9 The Statement cited Kraft as
supporting authority.140 In addition, the Statement again suggested
that the Commission will rely on extrinsic evidence in some cases.'41
Unfortunately, the Statement did not provide any new information regarding the nature of the circumstances under which the Commission
would rely on extrinsic evidence. The Statement, again citing Kraft as
supporting authority, said that an ad may "implicitly characterize the
amount of a nutrient in a product through representations regarding
the ingredients with which the product is made."' 42 The Statement
provides no guidance as to how a company can tell when a statement
regarding ingredients will be interpreted by the Commission as being
an implicit representation of nutrient content.
In sum, the 1994 Statement provides companies with no new information regarding when the Commission will or will not rely on extrinsic evidence nor does it provide any indication of how to predict when
the Commission will find a truthful statement to be implicitly decep135. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 327 (7th Cir. 1992)(Manion, J., concurring), cert.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993).
See, e.g., Statement on Deception, supra note 57.
59 Fed. Reg. 28,388 (1994).
Id.
Id. at 28,389.
Id. at 28,389 n.16.
Id.
Id. at 28,392.
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rive. Together, the Statement and Commission precedent leave companies groping for a clear rule regarding extrinsic evidence, the type of
rule that can be best established through administrative rulemaking.
3. Theoretical Proposalfor an Interpretive Rule
Substantive rulemaking is perhaps the most effective method of restraining agency discretion absent Congressional action.143 Throughout many areas of administrative law, both courts and scholars have
provided numerous reasons for the superiority of rulemaking as a
method of developing agency law.144 The advantages of rulemaking
are largely a result of the notice and comment procedure required for
most substantive rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).'45 The APA's requirement that agencies provide notice of
rulemaking proceedings and opportunities for the participation of interested parties in those proceedings146 often leads to a procedure
that is more fair, results in substantively
higher quality rules, and is
4
more efficient than adjudication.1 7

However, the Commission's authority to establish substantive
rules relating to deceptive acts or practices is restricted to trade regulation rules and nonbinding interpretive rules.148 Trade regulation

rules must "define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or
deceptive."14 9 Consequently, a trade regulation rule would not be an
appropriate mechanism for establishing a general standard for reliance on extrinsic evidence.
Interpretive rules provide guidance to how the Commission will
make decisions in future deception cases.15 0 Consequently, an interpretive rule would be a more appropriate mechanism for establishing
143. DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 131.
144. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wynn-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 777-78, 780-81 (1969)(Doug-

las, J., dissenting)(Harlan J., dissenting); California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co.,
379 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1965)(Harlan, J., dissenting); Merton C. Bernstein, The
NLRB's Adjudication.RuleMaking Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Act, 79 YAILE L.J. 571 (1970); Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Administrative Policy
Formulationand the Choice of Lawmaking Methodology, 42 ADInu. L. REv. 121
(1990); Johnny C. Burris, The Failureof the FloridaJudicialReview Process to
Provide Effective Incentives for Agency Rulemaking, 18 FL ST. U. L. REv. 661
(1991); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: PoliticalPolarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency
Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE L.J. 300 (1988); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78
HARv. L. REv. 921 (1965); Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: AForty-YearRetrospective, 40 AnMne. L. REv. 161 (1988).
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
Id. § 553(b).
DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 131, § 6.7.
15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1) (1988).
Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B).
See generally 16 CFR § 1.5 (1995)(commission guides are interpretive rules).
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a general standard for reliance on extrinsic evidence. However, interpretive rules are less powerful tools than trade regulation rules because 1) they do not carry the full force of law,1 5' and 2) they are
exempt from the notice and comment procedure.15 2 Yet each of these
limitations can be overcome. First, judicial acceptance of and reliance
upon an interpretive rule would produce a binding judicial rule
equivalent in content to the interpretive rule. Second, although interpretive rules are exempt from the notice and comment procedure, that
exemption does not prevent the Commission from holding such hearings and conducting such studies as it deems necessary for establishment of the rule.15 3

To provide advertisers with the type of guidance suggested by the
court,154 the Commission should establish an interpretive rule setting

forth, with clarity and particularity, circumstances under which the
Commission will rely on extrinsic evidence in cases of implicit deception. Such a rule would involve two components. The first component
would be a definition of the point on the deception continuum beyond
which extrinsic evidence is necessary to find deception. The second
component would be a definition of the characteristics that will determine where a particular advertisement will fall on the deception continuum. Establishment of an interpretive rule with these components
would produce many of the same rulemaking advantages typically associated with trade regulation rules-increased fairness, higher substantive quality, and increased efficiency.55
a.

Fairness

Establishment of an interpretive rule would increase fairness because it would provide clearer advance notice. The most significant
flaw in the current precedent based standard is its failure to provide
interested parties with adequate notice of what types of claims might
be deemed implicitly deceptive without resort to extrinsic evidence.
As Judge Manion recognized, this uncertainty has the strong potential
to result in a chilling effect on constitutionally protected commercial
speech.56 An interpretive rule clearly establishing the point on the
deception continuum beyond which the Commission will rely on extrinsic evidence would serve the function of improving notice, thereby
reducing the potential chilling effect on protected speech.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See generally the non-binding nature of FTC guides, supra note 32.
Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2) (1988).
See generally 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.5, 1.6 (1995).
Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 320-21 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254
(1993).
155. DAvis & PmRCE, supra note 131, § 6.7.
156. Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 327 (1992)(Manion, J., concurring), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993).
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Substance

An interpretive rule would yield a standard of higher substantive
quality than the current adjudicative approach because the Commission would not be limited to one set of facts.157 The Commission's case
by case development of its extrinsic evidence standard may work sufficiently well for implied claims that fall on that end of the deception
continuum closest to explicit deception. However, the case specific approach begins to break down in cases like Kraft where the implied
claim falls somewhere on the end of the continuum closer to deception
that is barely discernable. In such cases, the Commission lacks a clear
point of reference against which it can determine precisely where an
advertisement falls on the deception continuum. Absent the limitation of considering a specific case, the Commission could create such a
reference point by fashioning an interpretive rule that clearly defines
the point on the deception continuum beyond which extrinsic evidence
will be necessary. Furthermore, without the restraint of applying the
law to a particular set of facts, the Commission could define with particularity the characteristics that determine where a particular advertisement falls on the deception continuum.
c. Efficiency
Establishment of an interpretive rule would be more efficient than
the current adjudicative approach to dealing with issues of extrinsic
evidence because the rule's guidance would reduce some time-consuming aspects of adjudicatory hearings and eliminate some relitigation of
the issue presented in Kraft. Consideration of extrinsic evidence is
one of the most time-consuming aspects of adjudicatory hearings on
implied deception. This aspect would be reduced through establishment of an interpretive rule because respondents, as well as Commission attorneys, would likely introduce extrinsic evidence only in cases
where the interpretive rule suggests that the Commission will rely on
the extrinsic evidence. Although the potential would still exist for litigation over whether extrinsic evidence meets a threshold level of scientific reliability, such litigation would be largely restricted to cases in
which the advertisement in question falls beyond the point on the deception continuum where the Commission states that it will rely on
extrinsic evidence.
Furthermore, an interpretive rule would reduce the continued relitigation of the issues presented in Kraft. The issue of Commission
reliance on extrinsic evidence has arisen in several circuits numerous
times in the past. 1 58 Although the Commission has the discretion to
157. DAVIs & PIERCE, supra note 131, § 6.7.
158. See, e.g., United States Retail Credit Ass'n v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1962);
Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
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determine where on the deception continuum a particular advertisement falls, and consequently whether extrinsic evidence is necessary,
there certainly is a point at which a Commission determination that
extrinsic evidence is not required would be an abuse of that discretion.
Absent improved guidance, the issue is likely to continue to arise in
the future. However, establishment of an interpretive rule would
eliminate some of this continuing litigation by defining a priori the
point on the deception continuum beyond which extrinsic evidence will
be required and what characteristics will determine where a particular advertisement falls on the deception continuum.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Commission's decision in Kraft serves as an example of the
Commission pushing its discretion to the outer limits. The Seventh
Circuit was clearly uncomfortable upholding such expansive administrative discretion, yet its decision was compelled by precedent. In an
attempt to restrain the Commission's discretion and thereby reduce
uncertainty, the court advised the Commission to adopt a consistent
position on extrinsic evidence. The Commission has thus far failed to
heed this advice. The Commission provided no information in its 1994
Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising regarding its reliance on extrinsic evidence beyond the standard articulated in Kraft.
Furthermore, the Commission has not undertaken a rulemaking proceeding in the area of reliance on extrinsic evidence. However, the
issue is one well suited to amelioration through the Commission's authority to establish interpretive rules. Establishment of a consistent
standard through an interpretive rule would be in the best interest of
the Commission, as well as all interested parties.
Dennis P. Stolle '96

917 (1962); Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 883 (1960); Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959); Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959).

